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A B S T R A C T
Background: Hepatitis A (HA) incidence declined in most European countries in the past decades. We analysed
HA notiﬁcation data for Switzerland of 29 years looking for disease- and notiﬁcation system-related factors
possibly contributing to observed trends.
Method: Notiﬁcation data were descriptively analysed using ﬁve time intervals (1988–1993, 1994–1999,
2000–2005, 2006–2011, 2012–2016); and notiﬁcation rates were calculated.
Results: From 1988 to 2016, the HA notiﬁcation rate decreased from 9.5 to 0.5 per 100′000 population in
Switzerland. Median age and the proportion of hospitalised cases increased over time. In the 1988–1993-time
period, intravenous drug use was the most frequently mentioned risk exposure while consumption of con-
taminated food/beverages was most frequently mentioned in the 2012–2016-time period.
Conclusions: Notiﬁcation data does not allow reliably identifying current risk groups (e.g. travellers) due to low
case numbers, limited availability and reliability of information. It is important to document changes in the
surveillance system for later analyses and interpretation of long-term trends. Population susceptibility likely
increases underlining the importance of continued and continuous surveillance and prevention eﬀorts despite
decreasing case numbers. Operational research is recommended to further investigate observed trends of HA and
to enhance the abilities for decision making from Swiss HA surveillance data.
1. Introduction
In most European countries, incidence and endemicity of hepatitis A
virus (HAV) infection are classiﬁed as low or very low1 [2–5]. However,
this does not mean that the disease can be ignored. It rather implies that
the characteristics of HAV infections diﬀer from those countries with
high or intermediate HAV endemicity features.
HAV infection is usually asymptomatic or mild in young children
[6]. HAV infection is more often symptomatic with increasing age, and
may present with fever, malaise, anorexia, nausea, abdominal dis-
comfort, diarrhoea, vomiting, fatigue and jaundice after an incubation
period of 15–50 days [1,6]. Signs and symptoms of acute hepatitis A
(HA) are indistinguishable from acute hepatitis B (HBV) and C virus
(HCV) infections [6]. However, in contrast to HBV and HCV, HAV does
not lead to chronic infection even though relapse of symptoms and
fulminant hepatitis can occur [6].
Safe and eﬀective vaccines against HAV exist. HAV vaccination ra-
ther than passive immunisation is recommended for pre- and post-ex-
posure prophylaxis and can be considered to contain outbreaks [1]. In
areas of high endemicity, most people get infected at very young age.
Hence, asymptomatic infection is likely and the burden of disease of HA
is low in these countries. With decreasing level of endemicity, average
age at infection and disease severity increase. Therefore, it is assumed
that countries with intermediate endemicity levels beneﬁt the most
from universal vaccination against HAV [1]. The World Health Orga-
nization (WHO) recommends large-scale vaccination in areas with in-
termediate HAV endemicity and targeted vaccination of people at high
risk in areas of low and very low endemicity [1].
HAV is transmitted via the faecal-oral route from person-to-person
or through contaminated food and water [6]. Young children are an
important reservoir and source of transmission considering that the
majority of young children infected with HAV are asymptomatic [6,7].
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Infectivity of HA is highest during the second half of the incubation
period up until a few days after onset of jaundice [6]. Most people are
no longer infectious one week after onset of jaundice [6]. High-risk
groups for HAV infection include unimmunised travellers to areas of
high endemicity, men who have sex with men (MSM), and injecting
drug users (IDUs) [1].
Case fatality of HA ranges from 0.1 to 0.3%, but increases strongly
with age with rates of sometimes> 10% observed in hospitalised adults
≥40 year old or older age groups [6,8,9]. Globally, 14′900 deaths were
attributable to HAV infection in 2013 compared to 22′600 in 1990 [10].
In 2016, WHO published a guide for viral hepatitis surveillance
[11]. One of the three mentioned purposes of viral hepatitis surveil-
lance is relevant for HA: “detect outbreaks, monitor trends in incidence
and identify risk factors for new, incident infections”. Syndromic sur-
veillance is recommended to detect outbreaks while enhanced case
reporting is recommended to “describe trends in type-speciﬁc acute
hepatitis and identify risk factors”. Case deﬁnitions suggested by WHO
and case deﬁnitions used by the European Centres for Disease Preven-
tion and Control (ECDC) and by the Federal Oﬃce of Public Health
(FOPH) for Switzerland are presented in Table 1. In Switzerland, there
is currently no syndromic surveillance for hepatitis but reporting of
laboratory-conﬁrmed cases of hepatitis A (and B and C; and hepatitis E
as per 01.01.2018) is mandatory [12].
HAV seroprevalence and incidence vary substantially across coun-
tries of the European Union (EU) and the European Economic Area
(EEA), but decreased in all countries between 1975 and 2014 [2,5].
However, the notiﬁcation rate of HAV, 3.0 cases per 100′000 popula-
tion in 2014, has been slightly increasing again since 2011 [13]. There
is a high variability across EU/EEA countries also in terms of notiﬁca-
tion rates: Iceland reported zero cases per 100′000 population, while
Romania reported 33.3 cases per 100′000 population in 2014. In
Switzerland, the notiﬁcation rate decreased from 10/100′000 popula-
tion in 1988 to 2.6/100′000 population in 2004 [14].
Most EU/EEA countries recommend vaccination against HAV for
selected risk groups while only few recommend universal vaccination
(included in national immunisation programme: Greece; universal
childhood vaccination for parts of the country: Italy, Spain; re-
commended, but not included in national immunisation schedule:
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia) [2]. In Switzerland, the ﬁrst
HAV vaccine was available in 1992 [15]. Before, only passive im-
munisation was available for travellers at risk [15]. Risk groups, for
which vaccination against HAV is recommended, are presented in
Table 2. The costs of HAV vaccination have been covered by the
compulsory health insurance for risk groups since 2008 except for
travel-related and occupational indications [17]. For the latter, the
employer usually covers the costs for vaccination.
This study describes the notiﬁcation data of HA for Switzerland. It
identiﬁes factors potentially contributing to observed trends, including
changes in the notiﬁcation system. We investigated the epidemiology of
HA in Switzerland in relation to the current Swiss vaccination re-
commendations and trends observed in other European countries.
2. Material and methods
2.1. The National Notiﬁcation System for Infectious Diseases
HA has been a notiﬁable disease in Switzerland since 1984 [14].
Mandatory notiﬁcation of HA includes a “report on laboratory ﬁndings”
and a “report on clinical ﬁndings”. Current reporting forms can be ac-
cessed at www.bag.admin.ch/infreporting (available in German,
French and Italian).
Reports on laboratory ﬁndings are completed by those responsible
at the diagnosing laboratory, upon conﬁrmation of a HAV infection.
Reports are sent within 24 h to the FOPH and to the cantonal physician
of the patient's canton of residence. The current laboratory notiﬁcation
form includes date of diagnosis, type of sample, laboratory method,
patient's name, address, date of birth, and sex.
Physicians are to complete the “report on clinical ﬁndings” upon
receipt of a positive laboratory result for HAV, and send it to the can-
tonal physician of the patient's canton of residence, within 24 h. The
cantonal physician forwards this information to the FOPH and takes
appropriate disease control and prevention measures, if indicated. The
FOPH takes on and/or coordinates prevention and control measures if
several cantons and/or other countries are involved, or if requested by
the cantonal physician. The notiﬁcation form on clinical ﬁndings con-
tains information on the patient (name, date of birth, sex, address,
nationality), and the course of disease (date of disease onset and di-
agnosis, signs and symptoms, reason for laboratory testing, hospitali-
sation, sequelae, death). The patient's vaccination status and exposure
within 2 months before disease onset are also recorded. Information
from both notiﬁcation forms (laboratory and clinical ﬁndings) is then
entered into an electronic database at the FOPH. Reports on the same
patient are linked, whenever possible.
2.2. Data sources and analysis
Surveillance data on HA was extracted from the National
Notiﬁcation System for Infectious Diseases' (NNSID) database for the
years 1988–2016 (data as of 12 April 2017). Data before 1988 were not
available. Cases residing outside Switzerland and the Principality of
Liechtenstein, and cases ﬁnally classiﬁed as “no case” (see Table 1 for
case classiﬁcation) were excluded.
Data were analysed descriptively in terms of case numbers and case
characteristics (incl. possible transmission routes). For description of
case characteristics, notiﬁcation years were grouped into four 6-year-
and one 5-year-period. Notiﬁcation rates, deﬁned as the number of
notiﬁed cases per 100′000 resident population, were calculated using
population statistics from the Federal Statistical Oﬃce (FSO).
Population statistics were not yet available for 2016 at the time of data
extraction; therefore, we used 2015 population statistics to calculate
notiﬁcation rates for 2016. We compared the number of hospitalised
cases and deaths as reported on notiﬁcation forms with the number of
hospitalisations and deaths due to the International Classiﬁcation of
Diseases and Related Health Problems 10th revision (ICD-10) codes
Abbreviations
CI conﬁdence interval
ECDC European Centres for Disease Prevention and Control
EEA European Economic Area
EU European Union
FOPH Federal Oﬃce of Public Health
FSO Federal Statistical Oﬃce
HA Hepatitis A
HAV Hepatitis A virus
HBV Hepatitis B virus
HCV Hepatitis C virus
HIV Human immunodeﬁciency virus
ICD-10 International Classiﬁcation of Diseases and Related Health
Problems 10th revision
IDU Injecting drug user
MSM Men who have sex with men
NNSID National Notiﬁcation System for Infectious Diseases
VFR [travellers] visiting friends and relatives
WHO World Health Organization
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B15.0 (“hepatitis A with hepatic coma”) or B15.9 (“hepatitis A without
hepatic coma”) according to oﬃcial hospital and mortality statistics
(data obtained from the FSO). Main and secondary diagnoses/deaths
were considered for extraction of hospitalisations/deaths due to ICD-10
codes B15.0 and B15.9 from hospital and mortality statistics, respec-
tively. Data were analysed using the statistical software Stata (Version
13.1 [18]).
Notiﬁcation data were collected under the Swiss Epidemics Act and
hence, no ethical approval was required.
3. Results
3.1. Trends in hepatitis A case numbers and demographic characteristics
The notiﬁcation rate of HA decreased from 9.5/100′000 population
(628 cases) in 1988 to 0.5/100′000 population (43 cases) in 2016 in
Switzerland (Fig. 1). The highest notiﬁcation rate was observed in 1990
(14.2/100′000).
Median age of cases increased from 25 years (1988–1993) to 43
years (2012–2016). In the most recent years, no age group pre-
dominated while in the early 1990s there was a clear predominance of
young adults for both sexes (highest notiﬁcation rate in 15–24 year age
Table 1
World Health Organization (WHO), European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and Federal Oﬃce of Public Health (FOPH) case deﬁnitions for
hepatitis A surveillance.
Acute hepatitis/Hepatitis A case deﬁnition according to WHO [11]
Presumptive case/case deﬁnition for syndromic
surveillance (“acute hepatitis”):
Any person meeting the
- Clinical criteria
Conﬁrmed case (type-speciﬁc surveillance; hepatitis A): Any person meeting the
- Clinical criteria AND
- biomarker or epidemiological criteria
Clinical criteria: “Discrete onset of an acute illness with signs/symptoms of (i) acute viral illness (e.g. fever,
malaise, fatigue) and (ii) liver damage, which can be clinical (e.g. anorexia, nausea, jaundice, dark urine, right
upper quadrant tenderness), and/or biochemical (alanine aminotransferase [ALT] levels more than 10 times the
upper limit of normal.a” [11]
a Ten times the upper limit of normal (400 IU/L) is the threshold used by the State and Territorial Epidemiologists
(CSTE). Countries may also select lower thresholds that could be more sensitive or higher thresholds that could be
more speciﬁc
Biomarker criteria: IgM anti-HAV positive
Epidemiological criteria: Epidemiological linkb with a conﬁrmed case [11]
b Contact with a conﬁrmed case-patient during the referent exposure period or context of an etiologically
conﬁrmed outbreak
Hepatitis A case deﬁnition according to ECDC [70]
Conﬁrmed case Any person meeting the
- Clinical criteria AND
- Laboratory criteria
Probable case Any person meeting the
- Clinical criteria AND
- Epidemiological criteria
Clinical criteria: “Any person with a discrete onset of symptoms (e.g. fatigue, abdominal pain, loss of appetite,
intermittent nausea and vomiting) AND at least one of the following three: fever, jaundice, elevated serum
aminotransferase levels” [70]
Laboratory criteria: “At least one of the following three: detection of hepatitis A virus nucleic acid in serum or
stool, hepatitis A virus speciﬁc antibody response, detection of hepatitis A virus antigen in stool” [70]
Epidemiological criteria: “At least one of the following four: human to human transmission, exposure to a
common source, exposure to contaminated food/drinking water, environmental exposure” [70]
Hepatitis A case deﬁnition according to FOPH
Conﬁrmed case Any person meeting the
- Laboratory criteria AND
- Clinical criteria or epidemiological link
In absence of information on laboratory criteria:
- Both clinical criteria (icterus and increased transaminase) present AND contact with laboratory-conﬁrmed
case
Probable case Any person meeting the
- Clinical criteria but without any information on laboratory criteria (with indication of name of laboratory
and/or reason for testing on clinical notiﬁcation form)
Possible case Any person meeting the
- Laboratory criteria but without any information on clinical and epidemiological criteria OR
- Clinical criteria but without any information on laboratory criteria (without indication of name of laboratory
and/or reason for testing on clinical notiﬁcation form)
No case - Neither laboratory nor clinical criteria met OR
- Laboratory criteria met, but neither clinical criteria met nor epidemiological link present (but information
from clinical notiﬁcation form is available)
- Neither laboratory criteria met nor epidemiological link present (independent of presence or absence of
clinical criteria)
Laboratory criteria: anti-HAV IgM positive
Clinical criteria: Icterus and/or increased transaminase
Epidemiological link: Stay in an endemic region (high or moderate risk according to WHO, p. 95 [71]) or contact to
a laboratory-conﬁrmed case
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group, followed by 25–44 year age group; Fig. 2). In the two youngest
and in the oldest age groups (0–4, 5–14 and 65 + age groups) there was
no clear sex-pattern observed. In the 15–24, 25–44 and 45–65 year age
groups, males had a higher notiﬁcation rate. However, this male pre-
dominance decreased over the years. In 2015 and 2016, the overall
female notiﬁcation rate was even slightly higher than the male notiﬁ-
cation rate.
The proportion of cases of Swiss or Liechtensteiner nationality de-
creased during the observation period: 83.9% were Swiss/
Liechtensteiner (excluding those with nationality not speciﬁed) during
the 1988–1993-period, while in the 2012–2016-period 70.1% were
reported to be Swiss/Liechtensteiner (Table 3). A similar trend was
observed in the proportion of Swiss among the permanent resident
population of Switzerland: in the 1988–1993-period, between 81.7 and
84.6% were of Swiss nationality while in the 2012–2015-period (2016
data not yet available) between 75.6 and 77.0% were Swiss [19].
In all notiﬁcation periods, between 2.4 and 4.9% of cases were re-
ported to be vaccinated against HAV. For 45 of 285 cases with reported
vaccination prior to HA infection, at least the year of the ﬁrst and/or
last vaccination was reported. Of those, 3 were reported to be vacci-
nated before 1992, 13 received vaccination ≤14 days before disease
Fig. 1. Trend in number of reported hepatitis A cases and notiﬁcation rate from
1988–2016 with major “events” (e.g. concerning vaccination) labelled,
Switzerland.
Table 2
Overview of Swiss recommendations for vaccination against hepatitis A virus (HAV).
1992 2005 2007 Summary of current (2007) vaccination
recommendations as published in yearly
vaccination schedule (2017)
Source: [15] Source: [16] Source: [14] Source: [17]
Primary prevention
Non-immune travellers to countries with high
risk of HAV infection (mainly “third world
countries” and selected countries in Eastern
Europe)
[travellers]a Travellers to countries with medium or high
endemicity (according to www.who.int/ith or www.
safetravel.ch).
In case of adoption of a child from a country of high
endemicity, all family members (not only those
travelling) should be vaccinated
Travellers to countries with medium and high
endemicity
Illegal drug users Drug users People injecting drugs People injecting drugs
Partly recommended: Children > 12 months of
age visiting relatives in “third world
countries” or in Eastern Europe and
attending day care in Switzerland
Children from countries of medium and high
endemicity living in Switzerland and temporarily
returning to their country of origin
Children from countries of medium and high
endemicity living in Switzerland and
temporarily returning to their country of
origin
Partly recommended: Selected staﬀ of day care
facilities and children hospitals
Partly recommended: Persons in close
occupational contact with refugees, asylum
seekers or drug users
Persons in close occupational contact to people
injecting drugs (including prison staﬀ); and to persons
from countries of medium and high endemicity
(asylum seekers, refugees)
Persons in close occupational contact to drug
users; and to persons from countries of high
endemicity
Persons with chronic
hepatopathies
Persons with chronic liver disease (Hepatitis B, C or
other chronic hepatopathies, especially candidates of
liver transplantation
Persons with chronic liver disease
Persons in close contact to
people with HAV infection
Staﬀ of microbiological
laboratories
Laboratory personnel working with HAV or with
primates infected with HAV, or investigating stool
samples
Laboratory personnel working with HAV
Men who have sex with
men (MSM)
Men who have sex with men (MSM) (outside of stable
relationship)
Men who have sex with men (MSM)
Drainers and employees of sewage plants Drainers and employees of sewage plants
Secondary prevention
After close contact with a person with acute hepatitis
A, or after exposure to a potential source within 7
days after exposure (or after development of
symptoms of the primary case)
Within 7 days after exposure.
Staﬀ and persons in institutions, in which there was a
case of HAV (e.g. day-care centres, home for persons
with disabilities, retirement homes, casern), and their
families, if appropriate
In case of an epidemic (social environment of cases)
a Travel-related vaccination recommendations/indications were not considered in this document.
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onset and 7 received vaccination between 14 and 28 days before disease
onset. For one case, the date of last vaccination was after disease onset.
However, it was reported that this case received 3 doses of HA vaccine,
the ﬁrst one in the year prior to disease onset in mid-January. For the
remaining 21 cases, disease onset was reported between 31 days and 14
years after their last (or only) vaccination.
3.2. Clinical characteristics
Jaundice was reported for 65.0–76.7% and increased transaminases
for 57.1–86.6% of cases over all notiﬁcation periods (Table 3). Other
reported signs and symptoms included fever, gastrointestinal symptoms
(nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, diarrhoea), reduced general state,
weakness, myalgia, arthralgia, dark urine and pale stools. Fever, listed
on the notiﬁcation form since 2015, was speciﬁed for 39.3% of cases
since 2015 but only for 2.9% of cases between 1999 and 2014 (no
option to list “other symptoms” before 1999).
The proportion of hospitalised cases increased from 21.4% in
1988–1993 to 44.7% in 2012–2016 (Table 3, Fig. 3a). The number of
cases with hospitalisation indicated as “yes” on the report on clinical
ﬁndings is much lower than the number of hospitalisations due to ICD-
10 codes B15.0 and B15.9 according to Swiss hospital statistics from
1998 to 2015 (the years for which hospital statistics were available;
Fig. 3b). However, when considering only main diagnoses (as opposed
to main and secondary diagnoses), numbers from the two statistics are
comparable. The reason for hospitalisation (due to HA and/or for other
reason) has been included in the reporting form since 2006. In three
quarters of cases (171/228) with this information available, HA was
indicated as the reason for hospitalisation (including one case hospi-
talised due to HA and another reason).
Complications, recorded since 2006, were reported for 3.9% (32/
818) of cases and included coagulopathy, acute or imminent liver
failure, cholecystitis, and general malaise.
Oﬃcial mortality statistics, coded according to ICD-10, were
available for 1995–2014. During this time period, 46 HA-related deaths
were recorded (ICD-10 codes B15.0 and B15.9 as main or secondary
cause). In the notiﬁcation data, only 14 deaths among HA cases were
captured during this time period (36 deaths from 1988–2016).
3.3. Reported location of exposure and exposure risks
Exposure abroad (or both, in Switzerland and abroad) increased
from 39.3% in 1988–1993 to 58.1% in 2012–2016 while the proportion
of “unknown or not speciﬁed” location of exposure decreased (Table 3).
European followed by African countries were most frequently
mentioned as countries of exposure in the past. In the most recent years,
exposure in African countries was more frequently reported (Table 3).
The proportion of cases exposed in the Americas, Asia and Australia
remained stable over the entire time period. Italy, Turkey and Germany
were the three most frequently mentioned European countries between
2012 and 2016 while from 1988–1993 Italy, Spain and former Yu-
goslavia were lead exposure countries. Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and
Kenya were most frequently mentioned African countries from
1988–1993 and Morocco, Egypt, Togo, Ethiopia and Cap Verde from
2012–2016.
For the majority of cases (50.5%–58.9% for all notiﬁcation periods),
the source of exposure was reported to be unknown or was not speci-
ﬁed. Intravenous drug use was the most frequently reported exposure
risk in the 1988–1993 notiﬁcation period while this exposure risk was
not mentioned in the 2012–2016 period (Table 3). In contrast, the
proportion of cases for which contaminated food or beverages was in-
dicated as exposure risk increased over the years (2.2% of cases in
1988–1993; 28.5% of cases in 2012–2016). The mentioning of “contact
with an infected person” as exposure risk decreased over the observa-
tion period (18.2% in 1988–1993; 12.6% in 2012–2016) while “sexual
contact with an infected person” remained stable at around 4%. Ex-
posure risks mentioned in the “other” category included occupational
exposures, exposure to blood or blood products (including transfu-
sions), or (previous and/or current) residency abroad.
4. Discussion
Our analysis of Swiss hepatitis A notiﬁcation data from 1988–2016
revealed temporal trends in case numbers and case characteristics
which may be caused by changes in disease epidemiology but also are
likely to reﬂect changes in disease reporting and notiﬁcation.
4.1. No unexpected risk group for HAV infection according to Swiss
notiﬁcation data
Recently published analyses of HA notiﬁcation data in Switzerland
included data until 2004 apart from a recent article of the FOPH re-
porting on an increase in case numbers in early 2017 [14,20,21]. All
analyses except of the latter documented decreasing trends regarding
HA notiﬁcation rates that continue into contemporary times. Today, the
notiﬁcation rate in Switzerland is comparable for all age groups and for
males and females, though ﬂuctuating quite substantially in the setting
of low case numbers. In contrast, the notiﬁcation rate of 2014 in 30 EU/
EEA countries was still highest for the 5–14 year age group, followed by
the 0–4 and the 15–24 year age groups, and slightly higher in males
compared to females [13].
The strongest decline in HAV notiﬁcations started in 1990, even
before the introduction of HAV vaccination in Switzerland (Fig. 1).
Fig. 2. Male and female hepatitis A notiﬁcation rate by age group and year,
1988–2016, Switzerland.
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Table 3
Characteristics of notiﬁed hepatitis A cases, 1988–2016, Switzerland.
1988–1993, % (N) 1994–1999, % (N) 2000–2005, % (N) 2006–2011, % (N) 2012–2016, % (N) All cases, 1988–2016, %
(N)
Total cases (4328) (2334) (1105) (626) (262) (8655)
Possible case – (0) – (0) – (0) 7.0 (44) 8.4 (22) 0.8 (66)
Probable case 0.3 (14) 1.1 (25) 0.2 (2) 4.5 (28) 4.2 (11) 0.9 (80)
Conﬁrmed case 0.6 (27) 11.0 (256) 89.8 (992) 78.4 (491) 87.4 (229) 23.1 (1995)
Case not classiﬁed 99.1 (4287) 88.0 (2053) 10.0 (111) 10.1 (63) – (0) 75.3 (6514)
Sex
Male 64.2 (2779) 60.5 (1412) 60.1 (664) 56.1 (351) 51.7 (136) 61.7 (5342)
Female 34.5 (1494) 38.9 (908) 39.4 (435) 43.6 (273) 48.3 (126) 37.4 (3237)
Not speciﬁed 1.3 (55) 0.6 (14) 0.5 (6) 0.3 (2) – (0) 0.9 (77)
Age group, years
<5 2.4 (103) 5.1 (120) 5.6 (62) 3.2 (20) 1.5 (4) 3.6 (309)
5–14 7.6 (330) 19.8 (462) 23.1 (255) 12.8 (80) 9.2 (24) 13.3 (1151)
15–24 35.1 (1517) 16.4 (382) 12.3 (136) 11.2 (70) 15.6 (41) 24.8 (2146)
25–44 40.4 (1750) 39.1 (912) 33.6 (371) 32.9 (206) 25.6 (67) 38.2 (3306)
45–64 10.2 (441) 15.2 (355) 18.8 (208) 28.4 (178) 30.9 (81) 14.6 (1263)
> 64 2.7 (116) 4.2 (99) 6.6 (73) 11.5 (72) 17.2 (45) 4.7 (405)
Not speciﬁed 1.6 (71) 0.2 (4) – (0) – (0) – (0) 0.9 (75)
Total cases with notiﬁcation on
clinical ﬁndings
80.9 (3503) 89.5 (2088) 93.0 (1028) 91.4 (572) 93.9 (246) 85.9 (7437)
Nationality
Swiss/Liechtensteiner 70.2 (2458) 62.2 (1299) 63.4 (652) 62.6 (358) 60.2 (148) 66.1 (4915)
Foreign 13.5 (472) 21.1 (441) 22.4 (230) 21.2 (121) 25.6 (63) 17.8 (1327)
Not speciﬁed 16.4 (573) 16.7 (348) 14.2 (146) 16.3 (93) 14.2 (35) 16.1 (1195)
Reported location of exposure
Switzerland < 0.1 (1) 3.2 (66) 33.4 (343) 27.3 (156) 25.6 (63) 8.5 (629)
Switzerland and abroad – (0) < 0.1 (1) 1.7 (17) 4.7 (27) 2.4 (6) 0.7 (51)
Abroada 39.3 (1375) 46.5 (971) 42.2 (434) 51.9 (297) 55.7 (137) 43.2 (3214)
Europeb 38.3 (527) 49.0 (476) 38.6 (174) 34.9 (113) 25.2 (36) 40.6 (1326)
Africab 24.0 (330) 17.6 (171) 22.0 (99) 34.0 (110) 37.1 (53) 23.4 (763)
Americab 18.0 (247) 17.4 (169) 18.8 (85) 11.1 (36) 17.5 (25) 17.2 (562)
Asiab 17.3 (238) 12.7 (123) 14.4 (65) 16.0 (52) 19.6 (28) 15.5 (506)
Australiab 0.4 (6) 1.2 (12) 0.7 (3) 0.3 (1) 1.4 (2) 0.7 (24)
Not speciﬁedb 3.6 (49) 3.3 (32) 6.4 (29) 4.9 (16) 0.7 (1) 3.9 (127)
Unknown or not speciﬁed 60.7 (2127) 50.3 (1050) 22.8 (234) 16.1 (92) 16.3 (40) 47.6 (3543)
Reported exposure riska
Food/beverages 2.2 (76) 8.7 (181) 22.0 (226) 25.3 (145) 28.5 (70) 9.4 (698)
Contact with infected person 18.2 (639) 21.6 (451) 17.6 (181) 11.2 (64) 12.6 (31) 18.4 (1366)
Sexual contact with infected
person
3.5 (124) 5.5 (115) 2.9 (30) 4.0 (23) 4.1 (10) 4.1 (302)
Intravenous drug user 33.4 (1171) 10.0 (208) 1.7 (17) 0.3 (2) – (0) 18.8 (1398)
Other 3.3 (117) 5.0 (105) 2.8 (29) 3.7 (21) 3.7 (9) 3.8 (281)
Unknown or not speciﬁed 50.5 (1768) 57.3 (1197) 56.0 (576) 58.9 (337) 58.9 (145) 54.1 (4023)
Immunisation status
Vaccinatedc 4.5 (158) 3.1 (64) 2.4 (25) 4.5 (26) 4.9 (12) 3.8 (285)
Vaccinated with 1 dosed 0.6 (1) 6.3 (4) 48.0 (12) 57.7 (15) 66.7 (8) 14.0 (40)
Vaccinated with ≥2 dosesd – (0) – (0) 16.0 (4) 30.8 (8) 8.3 (1) 4.6 (13)
Not speciﬁedd 99.4 (157) 93.8 (60) 36.0 (9) 11.5 (3) 25.0 (3) 81.4 (232)
Not vaccinated or not speciﬁed 95.5 (3345) 96.9 (2024) 97.6 (1003) 95.5 (546) 95.1 (234) 96.2 (7152)
Manifestationa
Jaundice 74.1 (2596) 75.9 (1585) 76.7 (788) 70.1 (401) 65.0 (160) 74.4 (5530)
Transaminase increased ≥2.5
fold
70.1 (2457) 57.1 (1192) 76.8 (790) 83.4 (477) 86.6 (213) 69.0 (5129)
Other – (0) 0.4 (10) 4.7 (52) 19.2 (120) 39.3 (103) 3.8 (285)
None 1.2 (41) 1.6 (33) 3.0 (31) 1.6 (9) 1.2 (3) 1.6 (117)
Unknown or not speciﬁed 12.9 (451) 9.5 (199) 5.3 (54) 2.8 (16) 2.8 (7) 9.8 (727)
Hospitalisation
Yes 21.4 (750) 20.0 (418) 24.8 (255) 30.6 (175) 44.7 (110) 23.0 (1708)
Due to hepatitis A e – (0) – (0) 0.4 (1) 56.6 (99) 63.6 (70) 10.0 (170)
Other reason – (0) – (0) – (0) 21.1 (37) 18.2 (20) 3.3 (57)
Due to hepatitis A and other
reasone
– (0) – (0) – (0) – (0) 0.9 (1) 0.1 (1)
Unknown or not speciﬁede 100 (750) 100 (418) 99.6 (254) 22.3 (39) 17.3 (19) 86.7 (1480)
No or not speciﬁed 78.6 (2753) 80.0 (1670) 75.2 (773) 69.4 (397) 55.3 (136) 77.0 (5729)
Complications
Yes – (0) – (0) – (0) 3.7 (21) 4.5 (11) 0.4 (32)
No or not speciﬁed 100 (3503) 100 (2088) 100 (1028) 96.3 (551) 95.5 (235) 99.6 (7405)
Death
Yes 0.5 (19) 0.4 (8) 0.1 (1) 0.9 (5) 1.2 (3) 0.5 (36)
Due to hepatitis Af 15.8 (3) 12.5 (1) – (0) – (0) – (0) 11.1 (4)
Other reasonf 10.5 (2) 50.0 (4) 100 (1) 100 (5) 100 (3) 41.7 (15)
(continued on next page)
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However, passive immunisation was already available since the early
1980ies [22]. Additionally, campaigns among IDUs could have con-
tributed to the observed decline: The most frequently mentioned risk
exposure in the early 1990s, intravenous/injecting drug use, has in-
frequently been reported in the last 10 years. It has been hypothesised
that transmission of HA among IDUs could occur through sharing
equipment or due to contaminated drugs or generally poor hygienic
conditions [23,24]. Decreasing case numbers were also observed for
hepatitis B together with a strong decline in IDU as reported risk ex-
posure [25]. The decreasing case numbers were attributed to preventive
measures introduced to control human immunodeﬁciency virus (HIV).
The HIV/AIDS epidemic in the late 1980s and peak levels of drug
consumption in the early 1990s resulted in the establishment of needle
exchange facilities providing a “safe” environment for drug consump-
tion [26]. A study among persons entering heroin-assisted treatment
found that the proportion of HAV-infected persons decreased from 2003
to 2013 while the proportion of people vaccinated against HAV in-
creased [27]. Nevertheless, the prevalence of HA is still higher in per-
sons entering heroin-assisted treatment in Switzerland than among the
general population [27]. Reports on IDU as a risk exposure among
notiﬁed cases of HA from other countries are scarce. In Eastern Sydney,
Australia, one third of notiﬁed cases was associated with IDU between
September 1994 and June 1995 while this proportion dropped to 9%
between July 1995 and December 1996 [28]. In New South Wales,
Australia, recreational drug use decreased among reported HA cases
between 2000 and 2009 [29]. In contrast, in Italy, the frequency of
IDUs among cases of viral hepatitis (slightly more than half of which
were HA cases) remained at constant but low levels (< 5%) between
1991 and 2006 [30]. Similarly, IDU was a reported risk factor for 2% of
HA cases in 1994–1995 as well as in 2006–2007 in Arizona, United
States [31].
HA vaccination failure and clinical cases of HA among vaccinated
individuals reported in the literature are very rare [32–42]. Never-
theless, 3.8% of notiﬁed cases (285/7437) were reported to be vacci-
nated against HAV in Switzerland between 1988 and 2016. There are
several explanations for this notably high proportion: (i) “vaccinated”
cases might include persons having received passive immunisation (see
also footnote in Table 2) which has only a short-term protective eﬀect
[1,43]; (ii) vaccination may have occurred only shortly before travel or
in the framework of post-exposure prophylaxis – potentially too late to
prevent disease onset (even though the notiﬁcation form asked for
vaccination status prior to infection); and (iii) HAV vaccination may be
confused with other vaccinations, e.g. HBV vaccination, especially if
information provided by physicians is obtained from patients rather
than from vaccination cards (as it has been shown that travellers could
frequently not recall their vaccination history [44]). Nevertheless,
vaccination failure cannot be ruled out, especially in im-
munocompromised patients. A recent study among Swedish travellers
under immunosuppressive medication due to reactive arthritis has
shown that similar protection after two months can be achieved by
administering a 3-dose regimen (1 + 1 + 1 or 2 + 1) at 0, (1) and 6
months compared to a 2-dose regimen at 0 and 6 months among
healthy individuals [45].
The decline in the HA incidence led to an increase in the population
susceptible to HAV in the EU/EEA which was not compensated by in-
creased vaccination rates, as highlighted by Gossner et al. [3]. This is
Table 3 (continued)
1988–1993, % (N) 1994–1999, % (N) 2000–2005, % (N) 2006–2011, % (N) 2012–2016, % (N) All cases, 1988–2016, %
(N)
Unknown or not speciﬁedf 73.7 (14) 37.5 (3) – (0) – (0) – (0) 47.2 (17)
No or not speciﬁed 99.5 (3484) 99.6 (2080) 99.9 (1027) 99.1 (567) 98.8 (243) 99.5 (7401)
a Multiple answers possible.
b % among cases with exposure “Switzerland and abroad” or “abroad”.
c Occasionally reported for cases already before 1992 when hepatitis A virus (HAV) vaccination was introduced. It cannot be determined whether these cases
received passive immunisation against HAV (which was available already before 1992) or whether the information on the notiﬁcation form was incorrect. It is
suspected that physicians may not be able to easily diﬀerentiate active from passive immunisation based on information from vaccination cards and – in the absence
of vaccination cards – patients may confuse HAV and hepatitis B virus vaccination.
d % among all vaccinated cases.
e % among hospitalised cases.
f % among deceased cases.
Fig. 3. (a) Proportion of hospitalised hepatitis A cases according to notiﬁcation
data (bars, left axis) and number of notiﬁed cases (line, right axis), and (b)
hospitalisations due to hepatitis A according to notiﬁcation forms (solid black
line) and hospital statistics (bars; data for 1998–2015 only), 1988–2016,
Switzerland.
Source of hospital statistics: Federal Statistical Oﬃce, Neuchâtel, Switzerland.
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assumed to be the case also in Switzerland in the absence of universal
vaccination recommendation. However, data on population suscept-
ibility are not available. Vaccination coverage was assessed in Swit-
zerland for 2-, 8- and 16-year old children and adolescents and was 4%
[95% conﬁdence interval (CI): 3.2–4.6], 11% [95% CI: 9.5–11.7], and
28% [95% CI: 24.8–30.6] for two doses, and slightly higher for one
dose, in 2014–16 [46]. Between 2002 and 2012, 53.1% of travellers
seeking pre-travel health advice in one Swiss travel clinic received HAV
vaccination (in part combined with HBV vaccination) [47]. On the
other hand, a survey among travellers to tropical and subtropical
countries at a Swiss airport in 2002 revealed that only 26% of travellers
were protected against HAV and an additional 12% were potentially
protected [48]. It has to be considered that surveys conducted at the
airport might be biased (over-representing frequent travellers, and
considering only one mode of transport) as highlighted by Pedersini
et al. (2016) [44]. They showed that the frequency of international
travel and endemicity at destination are both associated with HA vac-
cination among travellers in ﬁve European countries. In 2014, 62.6% of
MSM reported to be vaccinated against HAV in a Swiss online survey
among MSM [49]. Further insights into vaccination rates and knowl-
edge about HA among Swiss MSM are expected once the data from the
European MSM Internet Survey (EMIS-2017) becomes available [50].
Recently, HAV outbreaks among MSM have been reported in several
European countries [51] including England [52], the Netherlands [53]
and Germany [54]. Our analysis did not suggest any similar outbreak
among MSM in Switzerland: in 2016 sexual contact with an infected
person was speciﬁed as a risk exposure only for one case and the male-
to-female ratio did not change compared to 2015. However, case no-
tiﬁcations for HAV more than doubled in the ﬁrst 22 weeks of 2017
compared to the same time period in 2016 (41 vs. 17 cases) [21]. A link
to the European outbreaks among MSM seems likely considering that
the increase in case numbers mainly aﬀects males.
“Exposure abroad” was indicated for more than half of recently
notiﬁed cases, suggesting that travelling is still a main risk factor for
acquiring HA. Previous analyses of Swiss HAV notiﬁcation data iden-
tiﬁed risk groups or diﬀerent exposure patterns among subgroups of
notiﬁed cases (e.g. among cases below 20 years of age, those with Swiss
nationality tended to be exposed in Switzerland while those with for-
eign nationality tended to be exposed abroad [14]). We did not conduct
such subgroup analyses considering the low case numbers in recent
years.
4.2. Relative increase in hospitalisations
Data on hospitalisations revealed two interesting trends: (i) the
proportion of hospitalised patients increased among reported cases, and
(ii) hospital statistics suggest substantial underreporting of hospitali-
sations due to HA in the NNSID. An increasing proportion of hospita-
lisations has also been reported in the United States [55]. Ly and Kle-
vens hypothesised that this observation is explained by a shift of the
susceptible population towards older adults together with the fact that
HA leads to more severe disease with increasing patient age. This is
likely also the case for Switzerland: while the median age of reported
cases was 26 and 25 years in non-hospitalised (incl. hospitalisation
status not speciﬁed) and hospitalised patients, respectively, in
1988–1993, median age for those two groups increased to 36.5 and 47
years in 2012–2016. An alternative explanation links the decreasing
frequency of HAV infection in Switzerland (or at least the decreasing
notiﬁcation rate) to physicians' decreasing awareness for the disease,
especially in patients with mild manifestations.
The number of hospitalisations according to hospital statistics is
comparable with the number of hospitalised cases according to notiﬁ-
cation data when considering the main diagnosis in hospital statistics.
When also considering secondary diagnoses, hospital statistics suggest
more than double the number of HA cases compared to notiﬁcation
data (Fig. 3b). It should be considered that re-admission of the same
patient is counted as a new case in Swiss hospital statistics except if re-
admission occurs within 18 days and in the same hospital (personal
communication, FSO, 11 July 2017). Still, we believe that the striking
diﬀerence between hospital statistics and notiﬁcation data is not fully
explained by re-admissions alone. We also speculate that the observed
diﬀerence, apart from under-notiﬁcation, could arrive from GPs com-
pleting notiﬁcation forms before the patient is hospitalised. If the
hospital physician then does not complete another notiﬁcation form
(assuming or knowing that the case was already reported by the GP),
the patient's hospitalisation is not captured by the NNSID. The same
probably applies to mortality data.
4.3. System changes inﬂuence trends in notiﬁcation data
The notiﬁcation form is provided by and submitted to the FOPH.
The notiﬁcation form was changed several times between 1988 and
2016, as were case deﬁnitions, classiﬁcations and data entry proce-
dures. All these changes are diﬃcult to document post-hoc for the
purpose of this study and to separate from each other; they make in-
terpretation of long-term trends diﬃcult. In the following we discuss
such issues using examples from Swiss HA notiﬁcation given that these
experiences likely also apply for other diseases and surveillance sys-
tems.
Introducing a new variable on the notiﬁcation form is a change
which is relatively easy to track as it leads to a rather abrupt change in
the data. The location of exposure to HAV could be recorded as
“abroad” before 1999 and as “abroad” and/or “in Switzerland” there-
after. In the notiﬁcation data, this is reﬂected in a sudden increase in
the proportion of cases exposed in Switzerland and a parallel drop in
the “unknown or not speciﬁed” category.
Similarly, the “reason for hospitalisation” and “complications” were
included on the form probably only since 2006 (notiﬁcation forms for
2002–2005 were not available to check). Such changes can potentially
be noticed even if old notiﬁcation forms are not available, but their
impact is diﬃcult to quantify. In contrast, more subtle changes, e.g. in
wording can also inﬂuence answers given, but might not be easily re-
cognisable in the absence of actual notiﬁcation forms or stringent
documentation of changes on the reporting forms. For example, main
features of HA (increased transaminases and jaundice), were recorded
from 1988 until 2016. Nevertheless, changes occurred repeatedly: from
1988–1990, they were listed under the heading “clinic”. From
1991–1998, they were listed under the heading “reason for laboratory
test” while since 1999 they are part of the section on “manifestation”.
Also, in 1999 the wording changed from “increased transaminases” to
“transaminase(s) ≥2.5× ↑”. While asking for symptoms under the
headings “clinic” and “manifestation” are likely to result in the same
responses, the heading “reason for laboratory test” might not: a
symptom might be present but not be considered the reason for la-
boratory testing and hence, not checked on the form.
Another, potentially important, change: up until 1998, all cases of
viral hepatitis were captured using the same notiﬁcation form entitled
“Viral hepatitis”. Only since 1999, separate notiﬁcation forms exist for
hepatitis A, B, and C (other types of viral hepatitis are not reportable as
per 2017). At the same time, the notiﬁcation form was revised sub-
stantially. Revisions of notiﬁcation forms are complex processes in-
volving a number of people and perspectives; we exemplify the Swiss
experience: the expert analysing the notiﬁcation data for a given dis-
ease tries to get the most relevant information needed for appropriate
interpretation of the epidemiology. Managers of the overall notiﬁcation
system (including data entry and management), and hence, with a view
on all notiﬁable diseases, try to avoid long notiﬁcation forms, frequent
changes and heterogeneous forms – e.g. once asking for nationality,
once for country of origin, and once for country of birth. Furthermore,
information should not be too diﬃcult to obtain/know by laboratory
personnel or physicians (those requested to complete the forms),
otherwise compliance will be low. Finally, the legal department will
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critically review the forms aiming at reducing the personal information
obtained to the essentials for fulﬁlling the mandate of the FOPH for
early detection, monitoring, prevention and containment of commu-
nicable diseases.
In summary, changes in notiﬁcation forms and procedures may be
needed at times, but should be kept to a minimum in order to allow
analysis and interpretation of long-term trends. This in turn is only
possible if changes made are meticulously documented.
4.4. System-inherent limitations
Patients' information is provided by physicians in charge of HA
patients. However, it is not known how complete and systematically
they assess e.g. exposure history. Assessing exposure risks in a sys-
tematic fashion is likely not a priority of physicians given that the
source of infection does not matter for treatment. This is reﬂected in the
high proportion of cases (> 50%) for which exposure risk is indicated
as “unknown” or not speciﬁed at all. We hypothesise that “traditional”
(well-known) risk factors are often overestimated compared to less
known risk exposures in surveillance systems. This could also be a
reason for the observed increase in “contaminated food and/or water”
mentioned as risk exposure: in the absence of “speciﬁc” risk factors such
as IDU and travel, physicians may be choice-biased being tempted to
indicate “contaminated food and/or water” instead of ticking “un-
known” or not indicating any risk factor(s).
Probably almost every person has consumed a food item which
could have been contaminated with HAV during the relevant time
window of 15–50 days before symptom onset. At the same time, reports
of foodborne outbreaks of HA – recently frequently associated with
fresh and frozen berries and fruits [56–61] – could also have increased
awareness that HAV can be transmitted through contaminated food.
The rather long incubation period, together with a wide range, and
more or less non-speciﬁc or ubiquitous risk exposures could also explain
the high proportion of unknown or unspeciﬁed exposure risks. Sus-
pected sources of infection are usually not followed-up, unless there is
evidence of an outbreak. Therefore, location of exposure remains
speculative as long as no mandated research studies are conducted.
Furthermore, the surveillance system is likely to capture mainly
severe and/or “typical” cases as these are most likely to undergo la-
boratory testing. Gastroenteritis patients reporting recent travel were
found to have a 3.6 times increased odds for stool testing compared to
patients not reporting travel in the 7 days preceding symptom onset
[62]. Similarly, we suspect that travel-related HA cases (or patients
with a history of recent travel) are more likely to be captured by the
NNSID. This may not compromise validity of the surveillance system,
but should be born in mind when interpreting surveillance data.
In contrast, we have anecdotal evidence from notiﬁcation forms that
physicians suspect transmission from a (symptomatic or asymptomatic)
contact person who had been travelling recently, but the patient him-/
herself (the suspected secondary case) stayed in Switzerland. These HA
cases would no longer be considered an imported/travel-related case as
the reported patient did not travel and was indeed exposed in
Switzerland. Hence, the distinction between imported and auto-
chthonous cases might be ﬂawed.
Similarly, the importance of migrants and travellers visiting friends
and relatives (VFR) is diﬃcult to evaluate: on the one hand, those born
in high-endemicity countries could already be immune and hence, in-
crease population seroprevalence in Switzerland. On the other hand,
young children having visited their home country (or the home country
of their parents) could be asymptomatically infected and spread the
disease once back in Switzerland. Generally it is known that VFR are at
increased risk of infectious diseases during travel [63–65], they are less
likely to seek pre-travel health advice [65–67] and are less adherent to
pre-travel health advice [68,69].
Furthermore, it is not known how often contact persons of HA cases
are tested and how this may inﬂuence notiﬁcation data. Testing may be
considered unnecessary for both, secondary cases showing clear and
typical signs and symptoms, and (potential) secondary cases not
showing any signs and symptoms of HAV infection.
4.5. Conclusions
Hepatitis A incidence is declining globally including in Switzerland,
apart from outbreaks (such as the recent European outbreak among
MSM). Case numbers have been low in recent years. However, con-
sidering that the population is becoming increasingly susceptible to
HAV infection and hence, the probability of outbreaks is increasing, it is
important to strengthen surveillance and prevention eﬀorts as shown by
the recent outbreak among MSM in Europe.
Current Swiss notiﬁcation data on HAV do not allow reliably
identifying existing (IDU, MSM, travellers) and potential new risk
groups as information on exposure to HAV available to and provided by
physicians is limited and case numbers are low. Patient information on
exposure is often poorly ﬁlled in on the notiﬁcation forms. Thus,
changes in NNSID data or outbreaks need to be followed up with in-
depth investigations to understand contemporary transmission pat-
terns.
Thorough understanding of physicians' approaches to diagnose a
patient with HAV infection, changes in notiﬁcation forms, case deﬁni-
tion, case classiﬁcation, and data entry is required for correct inter-
pretation of notiﬁcation data. Additionally, research studies are needed
to complement information from routine surveillance to answer speciﬁc
questions such as estimating levels of under-ascertainment, under-di-
agnosis and under-notiﬁcation, or evaluating best practices to collect
data on exposure. Such complementary information is especially im-
portant for interpretation of long-term trends of hepatitis A in particular
and of highly dynamic diseases and surveillance systems in general.
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